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A CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE ON THE DEVILS LAKE OUTLET:
TOWARDS AN ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT MODEL




Imagine, if you will, that on one side of an international border,
there is a lake which threatens to flood and cause damage to the com-
munities built around it. Over the last few years, high water levels have
caused great concern and serious damage to property. A large amount
of public funding has been spent by all levels of government to relocate
public facilities and protect private property from the effects of the
flooding. Residents of the area, exhausted by years of responding to
emergency conditions, are anxious to find a long-term solution so that
they will not have to wonder each spring whether they will be facing a
crisis caused by higher and higher levels on the lake. Government
officials release a news bulletin reassuring residents of the region that the
government will construct a drainage outlet which will reduce water
levels and prevent future flooding.
On the other side of the international border, government officials
release their own news bulletins stating that they are taking immediate
action to prevent the neighbouring jurisdiction from proceeding with a
water diversion plan which, if not stopped in time, could cause irrevers-
ible damage in the rivers and lakes which flow through the region. The
diverted water would connect a lake which is part of a "closed system"
to the larger drainage system with which it has no natural connection.
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Because it comes from a closed system, the water is more saline and
therefore lower in quality than the water in the larger drainage system.
Of even more concern is that it may introduce non-native fish or other
organisms to the rivers and lakes which form the larger drainage system.
In the worst-case scenario, these non-native biota could decimate the
native fish species which support significant commercial and sport fish-
eries. Government officials are cooperating to oppose the plan, citing as
their central concern the fear that transfer of non-native biota would
carry with it risks of unpredictable changes in the environment. Unfor-
tunately, the two news bulletins are talking about the very same project.
B. MANITOBA'S CONCERNS ABOUT DEVILS LAKE
Residents of North Dakota and Manitoba will recognize this situa-
tion as not imaginary at all, but rather as a simplified description of the
conflicting needs and points of view of North Dakota and Manitoba in
what has become the all-too-familiar controversy over the proposal to
build an outlet from Devils Lake into the Sheyenne River. Near Fargo,
North Dakota, the Sheyenne joins the Red River of the North, which
flows northward into Manitoba to empty into Lake Winnipeg, the tenth
largest fresh water lake in the world. I Lake Winnipeg, in turn, connects
through the Nelson River system to Hudson Bay. Manitoba rates "[t]he
total direct and indirect annual value of the Lake Winnipeg and Red
River commercial and sport fishery to the Manitoba economy [a]s nearly
[50 million dollars (Canadian)]."2
The Province of Manitoba takes the position that the addition of
Devils Lake water to the Red River system poses a potential threat to
these commercial and sport fisheries. Manitoba argues that the water
quality of Devils Lake, even at best, is much lower than the water quality
in the Red River and Lake Winnipeg and that the concentrations of
certain water quality parameters exceed relevant water quality standards. 3
In addition, Manitoba expresses concern about the potential for
biota transfer from Devils Lake to the rest of the Red River basin, citing
statistics which indicate that there has been no significant exchange of
water between the Devils Lake sub-basin and the rest of the Red River
1. See Information Bulletin, Government of Manitoba, Devils Lake Outlet-A Comparison of
Manitoba and North Dakota Views, (Apr. 3, 2000), available at http://www.gov.mb.ca/environ/pages/
news/devlake/ib000403.html.
2. Id.
3. See Government of Manitoba, Manitoba's Concerns: Garrison-Dakota Water Resources Act
and Devils Lake Outlet, available at http://www.gov.mb.ca/environ/pages/news/devlake/backgr.html
[hereinafter Manitoba's Concerns]; see also U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, St. Paul District, Flood
Control, Red River of the North: Devils Lake Levee, N.D., available at http://www.mvp.usace.army
mil/project-info/dev-lakelevee-report/ [hereinafter Devils Lake Levee].
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basin for about 1,800 years. Manitoba's concern is that during this time,
some organisms, and in particular, fish diseases and other pathogens,
may have become established in Devils Lake, which are not present in
the remainder of the Red River Basin.4
A specific example of this concern is the risk that striped bass, a
non-native species stocked in Devils Lake during the late 1970s, may
have survived. Striped bass would have the potential to do well in the
Red River basin and, being aggressive competitors, they could damage
the valuable sport and commercial fish stocks in the Red River and Lake
Winnipeg. Manitoba, in its position papers, points to the damage which
may be done by the unintended transfer of foreign biota from one basin
to another and the efforts being made to cope with the issue all over the
world, using as an example the accidental introduction of zebra mussels
to North America, which is said to cause about $3 billion in damages
each year to the Great Lakes region alone.5
C. THE INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE
It is not only Manitoba and Canada who oppose construction of a
Devils Lake outlet. They are joined by a variety of American interests,
including environmental public interest groups seeking to protect wild-
life and other natural resources, neighbouring states with opposing inter-
ests and landowners affected by the projects. An example is Minnesota,
the downstream state which shares the Red River as its border with North
Dakota.6 Minnesota is supported by the National Wildlife Federation
which advances numerous technical objections to the need for and
effects of the project, as well as to its economic efficacy. 7 How best then
4. See Manitoba's Concerns, supra note 3.
5. See Information Bulletin, supra note 1; Manitoba's Concerns, supra note 3.
6. See Letter from Kent Lokkesmoe, Director, Department of Natural Resources, Waters for the
State of Minnesota, to U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Omaha District (Sept. 10, 1999) (on file with
author); Letter from Rodney W. Sando, Commissioner, Minnesota Department of Natural Resources,
to The Honorable Paul Wellstone, United States Senate (Apr. 4, 1997) (on file with author).
7. See Letter from Steve Blomeke, Center Director, National Wildlife Federation, to Rodney
Sando, Commissioner, Minnesota Department of Natural Resources (Apr. 30, 1997) (on file with
author); see also Letter from Neil Tangen, President, People to Save the Sheyenne, to Members of Con-
gress (Mar. 15, 2000); Memorandum from People to Save the Sheyenne to North Dakota Citizens,
Newspapers, Public Officials, National Friends (Nov. 19, 1999). Part of the grounds of attack by the
National Wildlife Federation and others involve the allegation that the rising levels of the lake are
caused in part by drainage of wetlands in the upper basin of the Devils Lake area. These groups seek
to advance the environmental goal of preservation and restoration of wetlands. They also point out
potential effects of Devils Lake water on fish in the Sheyenne River and the other wildlife it supports.
These issues form the basis for concerns by the National Wildlife Federation, the National Audubon
Society and by People to Save the Sheyenne. See Eric M. Bryn, Comment, Through a Biodiversity
Looking-Glass: An Analysis of the Devils Lake Basin Water Management Plan, I GREAT PLAINS NAT.
RESOURCES J. 65, 92 (1996), which critiques North Dakota's watershed management plans for the
Devils Lake Basin, supporting the concept of basin-wide planning, but criticizing the plan's failure to
take account of the effects of the plan on the larger Red River basin.
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to tease out the strands of the international issues at play in the story of
the Devils Lake dispute?
The international dispute over Devils Lake is complex, involving a
wide range of environmental, economic, social and engineering issues
overlaid on layers of political, diplomatic and legal processes. Both
North Dakota and Manitoba are states in different federal systems and
both have complex inter-relationships with their federal governments,
which in turn have similarly complex relationships with each other. The
history of this political and diplomatic dispute and the problem in inter-
national relations which it raises are interwoven with the water and envi-
ronmental law of all four jurisdictions and with the treaty and other
international law which applies to waters flowing across the boundary be-
tween our two countries. In addition, the Devils Lake dispute is inti-
mately connected to the international disagreement over the Garrison
Diversion project, a story which has been unfolding for more than
thirty-five years.
In tracing the history of the development of the project, it becomes
clear that decision making has been and will continue to be affected by
specific international factors. These include Canadian diplomatic efforts,
the requirement to take account of Canadian concerns in environmental
assessment studies, the need to consider the rights and duties set out in
the provisions of the treaty between our two countries, commonly known
as the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 (Treaty), 8 and the potential for
direct intervention by the International Joint Commission (IJC), the
international tribunal created pursuant to the Treaty. This paper will
attempt to trace the story of some of these influences and analyze the
lessons that may be learned, concluding with a proposal for a legal
structure which may be used to manage this international dispute and
others like it.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE DEVILS LAKE-GARRISON DISPUTE
A. THE STORY OF DEVILS LAKE
1. Flooding in the Devils Lake Region
Lying in semi-arid north-eastern North Dakota, Devils Lake is
within the geographical area of the basin of the Red River of the North,
but is part of what is known as a "closed basin." A closed basin is a
8. See Treaty Between the United States and Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters Between
the United States and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, U.S.-Gr. Brit., U.S.-Can., 36 Stat. 2448, T.S. No. 548
(entered into force May 5, 1910) [hereinafter Boundary Waters Treaty].
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water system which, at its normal levels, has no outlet or connection to a
larger system of drainage. 9
Devils Lake is comprised of coulees, channels and basins which,
depending upon the water levels in any given year, may be separated
from each other by land or comprise a single lake.10 With no connec-
tion to the larger drainage system, it is subject to variations in level, with
extremes at both low and high levels causing significant losses.II Be-
cause it is a closed system, Devils Lake, like the Great Salt Lake in Utah,
tends to be more saline than lakes which have outlets to river systems.
When lake levels are low, the salinity concentration is so great that
fish and wildlife are seriously affected and boat access to the lake is cut
off, which causes recreation-related income in North Dakota to suffer.12
High lake levels, on the other hand, result in flood damage. There is no
doubt that the people of the Devils Lake region have suffered loss and
damage as a result of flooding in recent times. When it reached its
highest recorded stage in 1999, Devils Lake had risen about twenty-five
feet in seven years and caused over $300 million in flood damage.13
The recent rise in level has been caused at least in part by a wet cycle in
climatic conditions.14
In the past, the fluctuating water levels have been seen as two halves
of one problem, both of which should be solved by a single management
plan. The United States Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps), together
with the North Dakota State Water Commission, has a long history of
involvement in studying the concerns associated with the rise and fall of
Devils Lake. A Draft Feasibility Study and Environmental Impact State-
ment released by the Corps in April of 1988 studied seven flood outlet
control plans, each of which involved a release of Devils Lake water to
the Sheyenne River, 15 but the North Dakota State Water Commission
withdrew its support for the joint project because the study did not also
9. See Devils Lake Levee, supra note 3.
10. See U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Devils Lake, N.D., Status (Sept. 7, 2000) <http://www.hq.
usace.army.millcepa/pubs/devils.htm>. [hereinafter Devils Lake Status].
11. See U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Flood Control: Red River of the North, Devils Lake
Basin, North Dakota <http://www.mvp.usace.army.mil/project%5Finfo/dev%5FIake/basin%5Freport/
default.htm> [hereinafter Flood Control].
12. See id.
13. See Devils Lake Levee, supra note 3.
14. See Bryn, supra note 7, at 65.
15. See Strategies and Actions to Address Devils Lake Flooding, DEVILS LAKE EMERGENCY OUTLET
NEWSLETTER (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, St. Paul District & North Dakota State Water Comm'n),
Mar. 1998, at 4, available at http://www.mvp.usace.army.mil/projectjinfo/dev-lake/ NEWSLETTER.
PDF.
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include a plan for an inlet to Devils Lake. 16 The inlet was seen as neces-
sary to provide for lake stabilization and freshening (that is, reduction of
salinity) during low water level periods.
2. The Connection to Garrison
In tracing the story of the current dispute back through time, it is at
this point that it becomes clear that the story of Devils Lake is inter-
twined with the story of Garrison, for the most likely source of water to
supply such an inlet to Devils Lake has always been Missouri River water
re-directed north to Devils Lake through the Garrison Diversion Unit.
Canadian authorities have consistently expressed concern about both a
Devils Lake outlet and all portions of the Garrison Diversion project
which could bring Missouri River water into the Hudson Bay basin.
While Canadian opposition would continue to exist even if there were no
Garrison Diversion project, the construction at Devils Lake of both an
inlet and an outlet would comprise a direct link between the Missouri
and Hudson Bay basins, and accordingly, would raise significantly the
level of concern about accidental transfer of non-native biota.
From its inception, the Garrison Diversion project has involved
plans to bring water across the continental divide separating the Hudson
Bay basin (which includes the Souris River and the Red River of the
North and its tributaries, including the Sheyenne River) from the Mis-
souri River basin (which includes the James River and its tributaries).
These are two separate water drainage systems that support different
types of beneficial and harmful organisms.
B. ORIGINS OF THE GARRISON PROJECT
The Garrison Diversion project began its life as a far-reaching plan
for flood control and irrigation of lands in the Missouri Basin and for
irrigation of lands in the Hudson Bay-Souris-Red River Basin, with the
generation of hydro-electric power as an additional benefit.17 The first
16. See Flood Control, supra note 11.
17. It was a time in which there was a public commitment to massive engineering projects to be
constructed in order to control flooding, put thousands of acres of land under irrigation, and bring
electricity to many communities. See Robert L. Manley & Jeffrey J. Peterson, Selected Environmental
Law Aspects of the Garrison Diversion Project, 50 N.D. L. REV. 329, 330-32 (1974); Charlotte K. Gold-
berg, The Garrison Diversion Project: New Solutions for Transboundary Pollution Disputes, Il MANI-
TOBA L.J. 177, 177-78 (1981) (giving a comprehensive early history of the plans for the Garrison
Diversion and the reasons for the project); see also Sanford E. Gaines, The International Law Aspects
of the Garrison Diversion Project, 4 ENv'T. L. REP. 50085 (Nov. 1974); Comment, Garrison Diversion




step was the construction of the Garrison Dam, which flooded many
acres of North Dakota land, creating a huge reservoir known as Lake
Sakakawea. 18 Construction of Garrison Dam began in 1947 and was
completed by 1955.19 In 1960, the North Dakota Legislature created the
Garrison Conservancy District, an administrative agency whose job has
been ever since to facilitate development and local administration of the
Garrison Diversion Project.20
As economic assessments were performed and information was re-
ceived about the ability of the soil to tolerate and sustain large-scale
irrigation, the massive irrigation component of the project was reduced
until, in 1965, it was restructured and authorized as the Garrison Diver-
sion Unit, a canal system to "transfer water from 'the Missouri River to
the James River, Souris River and Sheyenne River Basins, and Devils
Lake Basin."' 21 Still, it was a grand plan which involved the irrigation
of large tracts of land in the Hudson Bay basin. It also included plans
for "Devils Lake Restoration." 22
C. OPPOSITION TO THE GARRISON PROJECT
As construction continued, opposition to many aspects of the Gar-
rison Diversion project crystallized around a variety of interests. A
group of North Dakota citizens banded together in a group called the
Committee to Save North Dakota, which was formed to oppose the
project. The National Audubon Society and others had concerns about
potential effects on fish and wildlife and about the destruction of
wetlands which would be covered under additional large reservoirs if
portions of the Garrison Diversion were constructed.2 3 By 1969, the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) had been passed requiring
environmental impact assessment to be performed, and throughout the
18. As described by Goldberg, supra note 17, at 177, and by Manley & Peterson, supra note 17,
at 330 n.16, construction proceeded pursuant to the Flood Control Act of 1944. See Dakota Water
Resources Hearing on H.R. 2918 before Subcommittee on Water and Power Resources, 106th Cong.
(1999) (statement of Chairman Hall on behalf of the Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold) (testi-
fying as to the proportion of land inundated by Lake Sakakawea that was Reservation land and
describing the losses experienced by Tribal members).
19. See Manley & Peterson, supra note 17, at 331.
20. See Manley & Peterson, supra note 17, at 331.
21. Pursuant to Act of Aug. 5, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-108, 79 Stat. 433 as described by Manley &
Peterson, supra note 17, at 331 n.30, who also cite the U.S. BUREAU OF R ECLAMATION, INITIAL GARRISON
DIVERSION UNIT D RAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 111-7 (1973). Manley & Peterson analyze
the political decisions which were made on the basis of early studies of the agricultural value of the
land proposed to be put under cultivation with massive irrigation projects.
22. See Garrison Diversion Faces New Challenges, supra note 17, at 10179.
23. See Goldberg, supra note 17, at 181; Garrison Diversion Faces New Challenges, supra note
17; Manley & Peterson, supra note 17, 338-39; Gaines, supra note 17.
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1970s groups of citizens began to take legal action based on its provi-
sions.24 Among these legal actions were efforts to use NEPA to slow
down, redirect, or bring to a halt some project features of the Garrison
Diversion Unit.25
Canada, too, had been actively advocating for its position. In 1970,
concerns were "crystallized in a Canadian aide-memoire," 26 prompting
discussion between the United States and Canada. A diplomatic note was
sent to express Canada's concerns in October of 1971.27 Early Canadi-
an objections focused on the potential increased salinity of the Souris
River which could result from irrigation return flows joining the waters
of the Souris River and its tributaries.2 8 Canadian diplomats cited and
relied upon the duties set out in the Treaty. In a Diplomatic Note sent in
October of 1973, Canada requested that:
the Government of the United States establish a moratorium on
all further construction of the GDU until such time as the
United States and Canadian Governments could reach an
understanding that Canadian rights and interests have been
fully protected in accordance with the provisions of the Bound-
ary Waters Treaty. 29
The United States Government was sufficiently impressed with
Canada's position to acknowledge in its reply in February of 1974 that it
recognized its obligations under the Treaty and to provide assurances
that no construction affecting Canada's interests would be undertaken
until it became clear that the obligation could be met.30
D. EARLY ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT BY THE BUREAU OF
RECLAMATION
In the meantime, the Department of Interior Bureau of Reclamation,
the federal agency responsible for the project, had been proceeding
with the environmental assessment process which was now mandated by
24. See Manley & Peterson, supra note 17, at 338-57 (discussing early judicial consideration of
NEPA).
25. See Goldberg, supra note 17, at 179-80. See, e.g, National Audubon Soc'y v. Andrus, 442 F.
Supp. 42, 43 (D.D.C. 1977).
26. See INTERNATIONAL JOINT C OMMISSION, TRANSBOUNDARY I MPLICATIONS OF THE GARRISON DIVER-
SION UNIT 7 (1977).
27. See id.
28. See Manley & Peterson, supra note 17, at 332.
29. See GARRISON JOINT TECHNICAL COMMITTEE, GARRISON DIVERSION UNIT JOINT TECHNICAL




NEPA. A Draft Environmental Impact Statement, produced in 1973,31
summarized the Canadian objections to the project, reporting that a
meeting had been held between representatives of the two countries at
which a decision had been made to strike a task force to study the
problem of the effects of return flows. Manley and Peterson, writing one
year later in 1974, observed that no solution had been reached through
the efforts of the task force.32
E. ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT BY THE IJC
Nevertheless, discussions proceeded between Canadian and Ameri-
can officials during 1974 about the concern which had been expressed
by Canada "over potential degradation of water quality and the
associated effects on health and property in Canada." 33 The statement
of its concern in this fashion was a clear reference by Canada to the
second paragraph of Article IV of the Treaty, by which the parties had
agreed that waters flowing across the boundary would "not be polluted
on either side to the injury of health or property on the other." 3 4
Finally, in October of 1975, Canada and the United States agreed to refer
the problem to the IJC for its study and recommendations as to the
measures required to ensure that the "provisions of Article IV . . . are
honoured." 35 By this time, the potential for introduction of foreign
biota into the water systems of Manitoba was understood as an issue both
by Canada and by the IJC itself. In accordance with its practice, 36 the
IJC appointed a bi-national study group of technical experts comprised
of an equal number of Canadians and Americans, whose job it was to
consider the issues impartially and attempt to reach consensus. 37 The
Board, in turn created five technical committees, comprised of fifty-three
experts, each to study one of the technical issues which required
assessment. 38 The Board came up with engineering modifications of the
project which were designed to prevent unintended transfer of biota
from one basin to the other.
31. See Manley &. Peterson, supra note 17, at 332 (citing U.S. B UREAu OF R ECLAMATION, INITIAL
STAGE GARRISON DIVERSION UNIT DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (1973)).
32. See id.
33. INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, supra note 26, at 8.
34. INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, supra note 26, at 1 (citing Boundary Waters Treaty, supra
note 8).
35. INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, supra note 26, at 2.
36. For the usual practice of the IJC, see INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, H ANDBOOK ON ORIGIN,
MANDATE, FUNCTIONS, STRUCTURE, PROCEDURES, POLICIES, PRACTICES AND R ESPONSIBILITIES (Sept. 2000)
[hereinafter IJC HANDBOOK].
37. See INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, supra note 26, at 140.
38. See INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, supra note 26, at 142-44.
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In August of 1977, after nearly two years of study, public hearings
and deliberations, the IJC issued its report. The IJC, while taking into
account the Study Board's conceptual design of mitigation works that
could assist in guarding against biota transfer, rejected its recommenda-
tions.39 The IJC took the view that because the effect of an unintended
transfer of biota from one drainage system to another could cause
"severe and irreversible damage to the ecosystem," the risk in the event
of a failure of the mitigation works would be too great. 40 In a deliberate
adoption of the precautionary approach, the IJC took the position that
the standard to be met was not merely to reduce the risk of such a
"biological 'time bomb"' but to eliminate it.41 It recommended that
the portions of the project which "could affect waters flowing into
Canada not be built [unless and until the two governments were to agree]
that methods [had] been proven that [would] eliminate the risk of biota
transfer [and such methods incorporated into the design], or if the ques-
tion of biota transfer is agreed to be no longer a matter of concern." 42
F. AMERICAN FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT OF GARRISON
CONTINUES
Meanwhile, the National Audubon Society, whose concern was
impacts to duck breeding areas in North Dakota,43 had filed suit against
the Department of the Interior, challenging the adequacy of the 1974
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and seeking an injunction to
prevent continuation of construction. A settlement was reached in May
of 1977 requiring the Secretary of the Interior to prepare a revised EIS
and submit a proposal to Congress for legislation based on the revised
EIS before proceeding with construction. 44
In February of 1979, the Final Comprehensive Supplementary
Environmental Impact Statement was released. 45 It recommended a
greatly scaled-down version of the plan but acknowledged that even this
plan entailed a risk of interbasin transfer of fish and fish diseases. 46
Construction resumed and so did the suit by the National Audubon
39. See INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, supra note 26, at 121.
40. See id. at 102-21.
41. See id.
42. Id. at 121.
43. See BEN RUSSELL, WATER DIVERSION LAW IN THE PRAIRIE PROVINCES (report prepared for
Environmental Law Centre) 36 (Aug. 1984); National Audubon Society, Inc. v. Watt, 678 F.2d 299,
301 (D.C. Cir. 1982); National Audubon Society v. Andrus, 442 F. Supp. 42, 43 (D.D.C. 1977).
44. See Charlotte K. Goldberg, The Garrison Diversion Project: New Solutions for Trans-bounda-





Society. Manitoba groups joined the ongoing Audubon suit, filing an
amicus curiae brief which argued that proceeding with construction
under the 1965 statutory authorization would violate Article IV of the
Treaty.4 7 An injunction was granted by the United States District Court,
but without mention of the Treaty issue.48 Ultimately, the Department's
appeal was successful, with the case decided on the ground that the
Secretary had fulfilled the terms of the settlement agreement. 49 That
being the case, there was no basis to prevent the Secretary from proceed-
ing with construction once funds had been appropriated by Congress
explicitly for that purpose.
G. TAKING CANADIAN CONCERNS INTO ACCOUNT:
THE REFORMULATION ACT
Notwithstanding the fact that Congress had made appropriations to
proceed with the project and construction of parts of the Garrison
Project as authorized by the 1965 Act were indeed proceeding, the
American federal government appeared to continue to have concerns
about the international issues. The United States and Canada agreed to
form a joint consultative group to address the remaining concerns and
consultations began on April 23, 1981.50 By November, 1983, the
Canada-United States Consultative Group had seen the need to obtain the
assistance of technical experts. At their November 21, 1983 meeting,
they established the Garrison Joint Technical Committee, comprised of
technical experts from all levels of government of both countries, and
charged it with the task of considering the environmental impacts and
engineering and biological aspects of the proposed project.Sl The Joint
Technical Committee was to function in much the same way as the
technical committees of the IJC Study Group had done before. 52
By 1984, the Federal Government had become convinced that the
Garrison plan needed to be re-evaluated, and it passed legislation
establishing the Garrison Diversion Unit Commission, whose task
involved the assessment of the contemporary water needs of the State of
North Dakota, as well as an assessment of the measures needed to
comply with the Treaty. 53 The activities of the Canada-United States
47. See id. at 181.
48. See Watt, 678 F.2d at 302.
49. See id.
50. See GARRISON JOINT TECHNICAL COMMITTEE, supra note 29, at 10.
51. See GARRISON JOINT TECHNICAL COMMITTEE, supra note 29, at 10.
52. See GARRISON JOINT TECHNICAL COMMIT1EE, supra note 29, at 10.
53. See Act of July 16, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-360, § 207, 98 Stat. 403.
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Consultative Group were suspended while the Commission did its work. 54
The result of the Commission's work was a set of recommendations,
known as the Commission Plan, which again reduced and re-cast the
Garrison Diversion project. 55 The Commission Plan recommended that
irrigation for the time being be restricted to the Missouri River Basin. 56
Although international consultation was to continue in an attempt to
develop methodologies for use of Missouri River water for irrigation in
the Hudson Bay basin in the future, the main focus of the project had
shifted to the supply of water for municipal and industrial consumption.
The plan still involved an interbasin transfer of water, but only on
certain conditions. 57 Water would be conveyed from the Missouri to the
Sheyenne River to supply municipal and industrial needs in the Red
River basin, but only after undergoing a treatment process.58 The Com-
mission Plan also recommended construction of an outlet from Devils
Lake with consideration of funding for an inlet, but advised that initia-
tion of either the inlet or the outlet be based in part on "NEPA compli-
ance . . . and satisfactory completion of consultations with Canada." 59
The Commission Plan was accepted by the government and adopted in
the form of the Garrison Diversion Unit Reformulation Act of 1986
(Reformulation Act). 60
The Reformulation Act provided that construction of the feature
known as the Lonetree Dam and Reservoir, which had been planned as a
part of the link between the two drainage basins and which was to be
located very close to the Sheyenne River, could not proceed without con-
sultations with the Government of Canada. The Secretary of State, after
consultation with the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency, had to reach a conclusion that no violation of the Boundary
Waters Treaty of 1909 would result from the construction and operation
of the dam and reservoir.6 1
It also provided that the municipal, rural and industrial water supply
systems for the Red River basin region could
deliver Missouri River water into the Hudson Bay drainage
only after the Secretary of the Interior, in consultation with the
54. See GARRISON JOINT TECHNICAL COMMITTEE, supra note 29, at 10.
55. See generally GARRISON DIVERSION UNIT COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT (Dec. 20, 1984).
56. See id. at ii.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id. at 10
60. See Garrison Diversion Unit Reformation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-294, 100 Stat. 418
(1986); see also GARRISON DIVERSION CONSERVANCY DISTRICT, GARRISON HISTORY, available at http://
www.garrisondiv.org/history.htm.
61. See Garrison Diversion Unit Reformation Act § 6.
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Secretary of State and the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency, has determined that adequate treatment has
been provided to meet the requirements of the Boundary
Waters Treaty of 1909.62
The requirement to comply with the pollution prohibition of the
Treaty was thus built right into the Garrison authorizing legislation. Sig-
nificantly, the determination was to be made not by the Secretary of the
Interior, whose portfolio included planning and administration of the
project, but by the Secretary of State, the member of the administration
who is concerned with international obligations and treaty compliance. 63
In addition, besides the usual NEPA process which would require the
preparation by the Secretary of the Interior of an Environmental Impact
Statement and Certificate of Decision, the Secretary of State was to
consult directly with the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency before making the determination of Treaty compliance. 64 Thus,
the statute gives evidence of both the effectiveness of the Treaty
requirement not to pollute and the importance that the role of environ-
mental impact assessment had assumed in American federal decision
making by 1986.
H. CANADIAN CONCERNS OVER THE GARRISON REFORMULATION
Work proceeded on supplementing the environmental impact
assessment to take account of the changes in the project contemplated in
the Reformulation Act. A Draft Supplemental Impact Statement was
released in December of 1986 which included a plan to complete
consultations with Canada before completing future versions. 65 Notwith-
standing the compromises represented by the Reformulation Act, Canada
continued to have concerns, and it expressed those concerns in two
diplomatic notes. The first was sent in July of .1987 for the purpose of
providing Canada's reaction to the draft supplemental environmental
impact statement. 66 The note took the position that the draft supplemen-
tal environmental impact statement failed to "adequately address many
of Canada's concerns regarding the potential transfer of biota from the
Missouri River to the Hudson Bay drainage basin." 67
62. See id. § 5.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See GARRISON JoIr TECHNICAL COMMITTEE, supra note 29, at 5.
66. See GARRISON JOINT TECHNICAL COMMMTEE, supra note 29, at 5, 13.
67. GARRISON JOINT TECHNICAL COMMIIrEE, supra note 29, at 13 (quoting Canadian Diplomatic
Note No. 177).
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The detailed comments which it attached made clear that a plan for
stabilization of Devils Lake was of major concern to Canada and repeat-
ed the need for consultation to continue as plans progressed. 68 The note
went on to propose a meeting of the Canada-United States Consultative
Group to discuss Canada's concerns. 69
I. CANADIAN CONCERNS INCORPORATED INTO FEDERAL
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT
The second diplomatic note was sent in May, 1989 in response to
the release of a report which had been issued describing alternatives for
location of a feature to be known as the Sykeston Canal, a structure
which had been proposed as the alternative to the Lonetree Dam and
Reservoir. 70 The second note reiterated Canada's concerns about the
potential for biota transfer and again proposed a meeting of the Canada-
United States Consultative Group to discuss the issues. 7 1 This time, the
Garrison Joint Technical Committee was reactivated and given instruc-
tions to "investigate and assess Canadian technical concerns [and] de-
velop recommendations to the Consultative Group on whether and how
[certain] project features might proceed without adverse consequences
for waters flowing into Canada." 72
The Joint Technical Committee reported in November of 1990
with recommendations on how best to proceed with the portions of the
project that they had studied.7 3 The report acknowledged that the intro-
duction of Devils Lake water into the Red River would be of concern and
included the recommendation that the water supply treatment plant,
which was to treat water destined for use in the Red River basin, be
located on the Missouri basin side of the Continental Divide. 74 It also
identified the features of the project in which Canada had no interest and
made general recommendations about the continuation of consultations
concerning those issues which could affect Canadian interests. 75 Work
could have continued on the project following this report, but in 1990,
the Administration made a decision to terminate funding for Garrison,
pending a re-evaluation of the contemporary water needs of North
68. See GARRISON JOINT TECHNICAL COMMrTEE, supra note 29, at 43-47.
69. See GARRISON JOINT TECHNICAL COMMITEE, supra note 29, at 13.
70. See GARRISON JOINT TECHNICAL COMMITTEE, supra note 29, at 13.
71. See GARRISON JOINT TECHNICAL COMMITIEE, supra note 29, at 13.
72. GARRISON JOINT TECHNICAL COMMI'-EE, supra note 29, at 1.
73. See GARRISON JOINT TECHNICAL COMMITTEE, supra note 29, at 1.
74. See GARRISON JOINT TECHNICAL COMMrrTEE, supra note 29, at 7.
75. See GARRISON JOINT TECHNICAL COMMITTEE, supra note 29, at 1-2.
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Dakota and of national priorities. 76
J. RESUMPTION OF WORK ON DEVILS LAKE STABILIZATION
Meanwhile, North Dakota was advocating for a resumption of work
on the Devils Lake stabilization issue. Following a Senate Committee
resolution in 1990, in February of 1992, the Corps of Engineers issued a
draft Devils Lake Basin Reconnaissance Report which addressed plans
for both an inlet and an outlet.77 The report recommended that the most
viable way to provide water for the inlet that it needed to stabilize Devils
Lake would be to operate the proposed Garrison treatment plant year-
round, instead of seven months a year. The plant was intended to pro-
cess Missouri River water before releasing it into the Sheyenne River.78
With both the inlet and the outlet back on the table, the North
Dakota State Water Commission once again agreed to participate in a
cost-shared feasibility study. The study was intended to plan for lake
stabilization by assessing methods of both raising and lowering the level
of Devils Lake as required. 79 The study was to be funded in part by an
appropriation made pursuant to the Energy and Water Development
Appropriations Act of 1993,80 legislation which also funded a broader
formal analysis of the alternatives for the design, construction and opera-
tion of that portion of the Garrison Diversion Unit which would direct
Missouri River water northwards into the Red River drainage basin. 81
Once again, work would resume on both projects, with the Corps of
Engineers primarily responsible for Devils Lake and the Bureau of
Reclamation responsible for the rest of Garrison.
K.. CANADIAN CONCERNS ACKNOWLEDGED IN DEVILS LAKE
LEGISLATION
In recognition of the international implications of the project, the
Appropriations Act provided that the recommendations of the Secretary
of the Interior which would result from the analysis were to be consis-
tent with the Treaty. 82 Also of interest to the Canadian position is that
76. See GARRISON DIVERSION CONSERVANCY DISTRICT, supra note 60 (describing the course of
events from the point of view of the [State of North Dakota] Garrison Conservancy District).
77. See Flood Control, supra note 11.
78. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, SYKESTON CANAL ALTERNATIVE
STUDY GARRISON DIVERSION UNrr NORTH DAKOTA: EXECUTVE SUMMARY, at 5-3, 5-4 (Mar. 1994).
79. See Devils Lake Status, supra note 10.
80. See Pub. L. No. 102-377, 106 Stat. 1315.
81. See id., 106 Stat. 1315, § 207.
82. The Devils Lake stabilization studies were to be conducted by the Secretary of the Army,
that is, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, while the analysis of options for proceeding with the Gar
2000]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
both the processes used in carrying out the analysis and the resulting
recommendations were to comply with the National Environmental
Policy Act.83
L. THE Focus ON FLOODING IN THE DEVILS LAKE BASIN
Because Devils Lake levels were rising in 1993 and the immediate
issue was a threat of flood damage, the Corps decided to accelerate the
portions of the study dealing with flood control.8 4 On February 15,
1996, at the request of the North Dakota Congressional delegation, the
Corps completed the Devils Lake Contingency Plan, which presented
options to be considered for implementation if the lake should continue
to rise. 85 As a follow-up, in August of 1996, the Corps presented an
Emergency Outlet Plan that included a plan for the construction of an
outlet from Devils Lake to the Sheyenne River during an accelerated
time period. 86
M. CANADIAN OBJECTIONS TO THE EMERGENCY PLAN
In an Aide Memoire dated April 3, 1997, Canada took the position
that "the outlet ha[d] the potential to significantly affect Canadian
waters in violation of the ... Treaty," that it could not be constructed on
an emergency basis and, therefore, did not belong in an emergency
flood relief appropriation, that it should undergo a "full environmental
review and cost benefit analysis and should be considered by Congress"
in that context. 87 Canada's official position again was stated in a letter
dated May 14, 1997, from Ambassador Raymond Chr6tien to House
Majority Leader Armey, in which Canada expressed its concern about a
rison Diversion was to be conducted by the Secretary of the Interior, that is, by the Bureau of Reclama-
tion. See Manley & Peterson, supra note 17, for an interesting analysis of the relationship between
these two agencies and their history of cooperation in the Garrison Diversion project.
83. See 106 Stat. 1315, § 207.
84. See Devils Lake Status, supra note 10.
In 1993, in accordance with Public Law 102-377, the Corps initiated a feasibility study
and EIS to address water management needs of the Devils Lake area. The study scope
initially included lake stabilization, water quality, recreation, and the enhancement and
conservation of fish and wildlife. However, due to the rapidly rising lake levels, the
study focus to date has been primarily on flood damage reduction.
U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS (St. Paul District), SCOPING DOCUMENT: DEVILS LAKE EMERGENCY
OUTLET ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 1 (Feb. 1999) (emphasis added) [hereinafter SCOPING
DOCUMENT]. It is clear, therefore, that as late as 1999 there was no intention to permanently drop
assessment and consideration of an inlet from the planning process.
85. See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, DEVILS LAKE CONTINGENCY PLAN (Feb. 15, 1996), availa-
ble at http://www.mvp.usace.army.mil. This is the explanation for the preparation of the plan given by
the Corps in their public information literature. An analysis of the political process and its effects on
decisions taken by the federal agencies in this process would make an interesting study.
86. See Flood Control, supra note 11.
87. Government of Canada, Aide Memoire (Apr. 3, 1997) (on file with author).
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supplemental Appropriations Bill which was before the House of Repre-
sentatives at the time.88 The bill included funding for construction of
the "emergency" outlet, when that same year the House Committee on
Appropriations and its subcommittee of jurisdiction had decided against
funding it.89 In June 1997, President Clinton signed the Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act,90 which did indeed include appropria-
tions for the Army Corps of Engineers to carry out pre-construction
engineering and design for a proposed "emergency" 9 1 outlet from
Devils Lake and to conduct an environmental impact assessment in
accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act.92
Canada's and Manitoba's insistence on linking the planning for an
outlet to potential future planning for an inlet seems to have been based
in part upon the position that was being taken by the leadership of the
State of North Dakota. In a letter addressed to North Dakota's United
States Senator Dorgan, Governor Schafer, and the State Senate and
House Majority Leaders stated that, while they were grateful for the $5
million appropriation for Devils Lake outlet planning, they were
troubled by language in the bill which they viewed as an impediment to
plans for an inlet. 93 The letter stated their opposition to the "permanent
ban on the inlet [which] remains in the bill, despite our efforts and yours
to soften the language." 94
North Dakota's objections to the bill included an unwillingness to
comply with "numerous onerous conditions," the failure of the bill to
guarantee future funding for completion of the project and the fact that
North Dakota continued to see an inlet as "important to ensure the long-
term economic stability of the Devils Lake region" and as a "significant
component of our State's water-development plan." 95 The letter went
88. Letter from Raymond Chr~tien, Canada's Ambassador to the United States, to the Honorable
Richard K. Armey, Majority Leader, U.S. House of Representatives (May 14, 1997) (on file with
author).
89. See id.
90. See 1997 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Recovery from Natural Disasters,
and for Overseas Peacekeeping Efforts Including Those in Bosnia, Pub. L. No. 105-18, 111 Stat. 158,
176.
91. The DEVILS LAKE CONTINGENCY PLAN, supra note 85, acknowledged that an "emergency"
outlet would face the "same challenges of environmental, WQ, biota, political, cost, and other issues
as a permanent outlet." The use of the term "emergency" may have been intended to affect the
obligations for environmental assessment under NEPA.
92. See SCOPING DOCUMENT, supra note 84, at 1.
93. Letter from Edward T. Schafer, Governor, State of North Dakota; Gary J. Nelson, Senate
Majority Leader, State of North Dakota; John Dorso, House Majority Leader, State of North Dakota,
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on to insist that "everything possible must be done to keep the inlet
viable in Congress as a long term option." 96
N. INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS EXPRESSED IN DEVILS LAKE
LEGISLATION
The Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act of 1998,
signed by the President on October 13, 1997,97 included $5 million to
initiate construction of a Devils Lake outlet. The funding was made sub-
ject to a number of conditions, including the condition that no money
appropriated under that, or any other Act, could be used to plan or carry
out the portion of the feasibility study of the Devils Lake Basin (author-
ized in 1993 under Public Law 102-377) which addressed the need of
the area for "stabilized lake levels through inlet controls," or to other-
wise pursue any plans for transferring water from the Missouri River
basin into Devils Lake. 98 In addition, the Secretary of the Army would
have to report to Congress that the
construction is technically sound, economically justified, and
environmentally acceptable and in compliance with the Nation-
al Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.)
[and the further conditions that there be a determination that
an emergency exists and that the] plans for the emergency out-
let shall be reviewed and, to be effective, shall contain assuranc-
es provided by the Secretary of State, after consultation with
International Joint Commission, that the project will not violate
the requirements or intent of the [Boundary Waters Treaty]. 99
Again, the effect of Canadian protests based on the Treaty had been
felt. The explicit reference to NEPA and the provision for the decision
to be made by the Secretary of State both give evidence of the awareness
by the United States of the need to comply with its international obliga-
tion and of the reliance which was now being placed on environmental
assessment to assist in accomplishing that purpose. The requirement to
consult with the IJC went one step further in ensuring that Treaty obliga-
tions would be met, although stopping short of a requirement for a
reference to be made such as had been done for Garrison.
96. Id.
97. See Pub. L. No. 105-62, 111 Stat. 1320.
98. See id., 111 Stat. at 1324.
99. Id., 11I Stat. at 1323-24.
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Subsequent Energy and Water Development Appropriations Acts
have contained the identical conditions.100 As yet, no construction funds
have been allotted to the Corps under this authority because the condi-
tions have not been fulfilled. The pre-construction engineering, design
and associated environmental impact assessment have not been complet-
ed. Some environmental assessment studies have continued, but the for-
mal process for preparation of an environmental impact statement has
proceeded only to the "scoping" stage, at which the project itself is
defined, the issues to be covered in the environmental assessment are
described and the methods for conducting the assessment are planned.
0. PUSHING AHEAD WITH THE DEVILS LAKE OUTLET PLAN
Public information brochures published by the Corps as late as
September 7, 2000, indicate that consideration of an inlet is "generally
abeyant while resources are focused on the outlet design and related
environmental work."I01 The brochures indicate that the Corps is pre-
pared to proceed with an accelerated outlet construction schedule on the
assumption that it will receive $2 million in 2000 and an additional
$5.7 million in fiscal years 2001 and 2002 to cover the anticipated
additional pre-construction engineering design and environmental assess-
ment cost. 102 Ultimately, in the second session of the 106th Congress,
the Senate narrowly approved the Energy and Water Development Ap-
propriations Act of 2000,103 which allocated an additional $4 million to
continue environmental studies with respect to the Devils Lake outlet in
2000 and 2001, but the bill was vetoed by the President for other rea-
sons. At this writing, at the close of the 106th Congress, it appears likely
than an amended appropriation bill will pass and be signed into law
before the end of the session. 104 It is not known whether the bill will
have the same protections for Canada that the other appropriation bills
have had.
100. See Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-245, 112
Stat. 1838; Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-60, 113 Stat.
483.
101. Devils Lake Status, supra note 10.
102. See Devils Lake Status, supra note 10.
103. H.R. 4733, 106th Cong. (2000).
104. During the editing of this article, an amended appropriation bill was passed. See Pub. L. No.
106-60, 173 Stat. 483 (2000).
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P. MANITOBA'S POSITION
Manitoba consistently has taken the view that "[b]ecause an
artificial outlet from Devils Lake to the Sheyenne River may signifi-
cantly affect the downstream aquatic ecosystem within Manitoba and
Canada and because the extent of these impacts are not known, a full,
comprehensive, and scientifically-credible, environmental impact state-
ment must be completed prior to construction in accordance with the
National Environmental Policy Act."i 05 In articulating its position,
Manitoba relies upon the Treaty Article IV duty not to pollute to the in-
jury of health or property on the other side of the border, and it
advocates consultation with the IJC as a step in the resolution of the
dispute.106 The position of Manitoba has been expressed directly in
statements by the Premiers of Manitoba to Governor Schafer of North
Dakota since 1996. In 1998, Governor Schafer requested that Manitoba
designate an official to serve as an "ex officio member to the North
Dakota Devils Lake Outlet Management Advisory Committee." 107
In his letter of reply, Premier Filmon took the position that it would
not be appropriate for Manitoba to be represented on a Management
Advisory Committee when the construction of the outlet project had not
yet been authorized and there were "numerous domestic processes in
the United States which [had] yet to be initiated or completed."O8 He
also affirmed Manitoba's understanding that there would have to be
compliance with the NEPA, the Treaty, and "consultation with the
International Joint Commission." 109 Clearly, Manitoba did not wish to
be seen as having agreed to the construction of an outlet. In October of
1999, the newly-elected Premier of Manitoba, Mr. Doer, visited both
Washington and North Dakota to express Manitoba's opposition to the
Devils Lake outlet plan. 110
105. Information Bulletin, supra note 1.
106. See Manitoba's Concerns, supra note 3.
107. Letter from Premier Gary Filmon, Premier of the Province of Manitoba, to the Honorable
Edward T. Schafer, Governor of the State of North Dakota (Jan. 6, 1998) (on file with author).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See Press Release, State of North Dakota, Schafer Invites Doer to Visit Devils Lake (Oct.
28, 1999) (on file with author). A similar position to Manitoba's was expressed in a statement made on
December 2, 1999 in the Senate of Canada by the Honourable Janis Johnson, and in a subsequent
exchange of correspondence with Governor Schafer. See Letter from Janis G. Johnson, Senate of
Canada, to Governor Edward T. Schafer, State of North Dakota (Feb. 23, 2000) (on file with author);
Letter from Edward T. Schafer, Governor, State of North Dakota, to the Honorable Janis Johnson,
Senate of Canada (Dec. 10, 1999) (on file with author); Debates of the Senate (Hansard), 2d Sess.,
36th Parliament (Can.), Vol. 138, Issue 15 (Thursday, Dec. 2, 1999).
836 [VOL. 76:817
DEVILS LAKE OUTLET
Q. CANADA'S DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS
On March 8, 2000, Ambassador Chr6tien wrote to the Chairman of
the Energy and Water Development Subcommittee of the Appropriations
Committee of the United States House of Representatives to express
Canada's and Manitoba's strong opposition to the construction of an
outlet from Devils Lake into the Sheyenne River. Ill In the letter, Canada
took the position that additional funds should not be provided for the
outlet project unless and until issues of concern to Canada had been
thoroughly addressed through the studies which were mandated in pre-
vious statutes and there had been meaningful consultation with Canada
under the Treaty. 112 The letter contains a detailed listing of the argu-
ments against the use of an outlet to solve the problem at Devils Lake
and refers to the risk of an eventual tie-in to an inlet connected with the
Garrison Project. 13
In addition to these efforts, Foreign Affairs Minister Axworthy and
a Member of Parliament from Winnipeg, Manitoba, visited Washington
in February of 2000 to explain Canada's position in discussions with
Senators and Congressmen."l 4 Ambassador Chr6tien again stated Cana-
da's position in a letter dated March 14, 2000, to the Chairman of
Energy and Water Development Subcommittee of the Appropriations
Committee, advising that Canada could not agree to the Devils Lake
outlet project as a solution and recommending denial of the Admini-
stration's request for $6.6 million in emergency supplemental funding
for pre-construction activities. 115
R. THE GARRISON PROJECT TODAY
Meanwhile, during the 1990s, pursuant to the authority granted by
the Reformulation Act, the Garrison Conservancy District has continued
to be active. As an example, in December of 1993, a Sykeston Canal
Alternative Study'' 6 was released which proposed a plan that took
11. See Letter from Raymond Chrdtien, Canada's Ambassador to the United States, to the
Honorable Ron Packard, Chairman, Energy and Water Development Subcommittee, Appropriations
Committee, United States House of Representatives (Mar. 8, 2000) (on file with author).
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See Paul Samyn, Martin, Axworthy Voice Concerns, WINNIPEG FREE PRESS (Feb. 12, 2000), at
A4, available at 2000 WL 2351823.
115. See Letter from Raymond Chrdtien, Canada's Ambassador to the United States, to the
Honorable Pete V. Domenici, Chairman, Energy and Water Development Subcommittee, Appropria-
tions Committee, United States Senate (Mar. 14, 2000) (on file with author).
116. See SYKESTON CANAL ALTERNATIVE STUDY, supra note 78.
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account of the recommendations of the Garrison Joint Technical Com-
mittee. Funds have been provided throughout for operation and mainte-
nance, while the Bureau of Reclamation has continued to study the
issues.1l7 In September of 1994, the Canada-United States Consultative
Group met and gave the Joint Technical Committee an ongoing mandate
to monitor Garrison activities.118 The Joint Technical Committee has
continued to work on technical and scientific issues for most of the
decade. 119 The view of at least the Manitoba experts who sit on the Joint
Technical Committee is that its members should work together with a
view to achieving results that are based on sound technical and scientific
principles and evidence.120
A new amended Garrison project was proposed in the form of the
Dakota Water Resources Act of 1997, but it did not pass during the
105th Congress. 121 Another attempt was made in the 106th Congress,
with new legislation, the Dakota Water Resources Act of 1999. The bill
was introduced and Congressional subcommittee hearings were held to
consider it. 122 The bill was amended, renamed the Dakota Water Resourc-
es Act of 2000, and enacted. 123 This statute will yet again reformulate
the Garrison project, shifting emphasis to the use of treated Missouri
River water to supply municipal and industrial systems in parts of the
Red River basin.124 It will also provide for the use of that water for
streamflow augmentation and groundwater recharge, while leaving open
the possibility for other uses. 125
Canadian officials have not accepted the notion that treatment of
Missouri River water can adequately protect against a transfer of biota to
the Hudson Bay basin. Throughout the last few years, Canadian officials
have continued diplomatic efforts to register Canada's and Manitoba's
objections to both the Devils Lake and Garrison projects, citing concerns
about risks to Canadian waters in Manitoba associated with interbasin
117. Interview with Robert V. Oleson, Coordinator and Senior Adviser, Transboundary Waters
Office, Manitoba Conservation (Oct. 2000). See also the annual reports published at the Garrison
Conservancy District, available at its website at http://www.garisondiv.org.
118. Id. Mr. Oleson is a member of the Canada-United Sates Consultative Group.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. H.R. 3012, 105th Cong. (1997): S. 1515,105th Cong. (1997).
122. H.R. 2918, 106th Cong. (1999); S. 623, 106th Cong. (2000).
123. See Pub. L. No. 106-554, 14 Stat. 2763 (2000); see also David Kuxhaus, Back-Room Deal
on Diversion Feared, WINNIPEG FREE PRESS, Oct. 13, 2000, at A9, available at 2000 WL 26951854; N.
Dakota Water Plan Won't Hurt Manitoba,WINNPEo FREE PRESS, Oct. 15, 2000, at A2, available at 2000
WL 26952013; Missouri Attorney General and Canada Protest Bill, AssoCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRES,
Oct. 16, 2000.
The passage of the Dakota Water Resources Act of 2000 occurred during the editing of this
article. Thus, its implications are not reflected in the recommendations or conclusions of the author.




transfers of invasive species. 12 6 Recent communications have continued
to rely on the Treaty provisions, but also have relied on President
Clinton's February, 1999 Executive Order on Invasive Species. 127 The
Dakota Water Resources Act of 2000,128 acknowledges the need to
comply with the Treaty and to perform environmental impact assessment
pursuant to NEPA, but does not require direct consultation with Canada
or with the IJC.129 It appears that it may also de-authorize funding for
the planning of a Devils Lake inlet as part of the Garrison project.
S. THE NORTH DAKOTA STATE PLAN
While the Corps of Engineers' long term and emergency proposals
for the construction of an outlet from Devils Lake have been advancing
slowly through the study and planning process, and political efforts have
been proceeding to obtain further funding from the federal Government,
the State of North Dakota has announced a plan to construct an alterna-
tive emergency outlet without the use of Federal funding. 130 On January
19, 2000, the State of North Dakota announced that Governor Schafer
had issued an executive order that would "hasten the engineering and
design work for a Twin Lakes temporary emergency outlet."l 3 I The
Twin Lakes outlet proposal is an option which had been assessed and
rejected by the Corps of Engineers in its 1993 report.132 North Dakota's
State Engineer, David Sprynczynatyk, said recently that the State is
considering a second plan, which involves building a pipeline along U.S.
Highway 281.133
126. See Can. Diplomatic Note No. 0271 (July 7, 1998); Missouri Attorney General and Canada
Protest Bill, supra note 123; Letter from Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Govern-
ment of Canada, to The Honourable Madeleine K. Albright, Secretary of State of the United States
(Sept. 20, 1999) (file with author) [hereinafter Axworthy Letter]; Letter from Raymond Chr6tien,
Canada's Ambassador to the United States, to The Honorable John T. Doolittle, Chairman, Subcom-
mittee on Water and Power, Committee on Resources, U.S. House of Representatives (Sept. 26, 1999)
(on file with author).
127. See Axworthy Letter, supra note 126.
128. See Pub. L. No. 106-554, 14 Stat. 2763 (2000).
129. See id.
130. See NORTH DAKOTA STATE WATER C OMMISSION, TwIN LAKES TEMPORARY EMERGENCY OuTLET
(Nov. 1999). It would appear that this plan is designed to avoid federal environmental assessment
under NEPA: "If a project of this nature required a Section 404 Permit [that is a permanent Federal
permit for projects that may affect wetlands], it is likely that an environment impact statement would
be required. This would effectively prevent development of the project in the timely fashion
warranted by the emergency and would add greatly to its cost." Id. at 8.
131. Press Release, State of North Dakota, State Moves Forward on Devils Lake Relief Plans
(Jan. 19, 2000).
132. See Strategies and Actions, supra note 15.
133. See Devils Lake Alternative Presented, AssocIATED PRESS (Sept. 2000), available at http:I/
www.swc.state.nd.us/projects/archives/altemative.html.
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It appears that the State's emergency plan is proceeding,1 34 even
though the Corps of Engineers reports that throughout the summer of
2000, due to a dry fall and early winter, Devils Lake has remained a foot
below the level it reached in 1999, when it was at its highest.135 On
October 4, 2000, Governor Schafer wrote to Premier Doer to suggest
once again that Manitoba participate in an environmental assessment
process to be specially designed by North Dakota as part of the State
emergency outlet plan.136 In his reply, Premier Doer took the position
that the requirement to comply with the Treaty mandates participation
by both federal governments and that the environmental assessment
process to be followed must be the one specified under NEPA.137
Newspaper articles attribute comments to State officials which indicate
that the North Dakota is proceeding with its plan in an effort to avoid
federal environmental impact assessment obligations.138
State officials are quoted as saying that although the State does
not require environmental impact assessment of its own projects, it
intends to do an expedited review which will "concentrate on the hot
topics" in an effort to "appease opponents of the project."1 39 A recent
news item reports that Governor Schafer has contacted Minnesota and
Manitoba to ask them to contribute to a "technical team" to perform
this expedited assessment, without also reporting that Premier Doer has
refused to do So.140
III. DISPUTE RESOLUTION
A. THE TREATY
1. A General View
It is clear that with or without a link to Garrison, Canadian opposi-
tion to a Devils Lake outlet will continue. The problem is how to accom-
modate the international concerns associated with the project in the
context of the larger political and legal process. One consideration must
134. See id.
135. See Devils Lake Status, supra note 10.
136. See Letter from Gary Doer, Premier of the Province of Manitoba to The Honorable Edward
T. Schafer, Governor of North Dakota (Oct. 12, 2000) (text of letter provided to the author from
Government of Manitoba records)(referring to an October 4, 2000, letter from Edward T. Schafer,
Governor of North Dakota, to Gary Doer, Premier of the Province of Manitoba)
137. See id.
138. See, for example, the articles cited at supra note 133 and infra note 139.
139. SWC Continues to Move Ahead on Twin Lakes Outlet, DEVILS LAKE J. (Devils Lake, N.D.),




be the effect of the Treaty on the dispute and any remedies that it offers
for a problem such as this one. The Treaty is one of the oldest and by
all accounts, one of the most significant treaties in existence be-tween
Canada and the United States. While there is disagreement about both
the effectiveness of the Treaty provisions and the proper role for the IJC,
there appears to be a consensus among writers in the legal liter-ature that
the Treaty has continuing value and represents a significant international
achievement in environmental protection of water resources. 141
The IJC itself has been the subject of some scholarly interest. It is a
bi-national body, comprised of six commissioners, three appointed by
the United States and three by Canada.14 2 The IJC describes itself as
"pursu[ing] the common good of both countries as an independent and
objective adviser to the two governments" 143 It contrasts its identity with
that of bi-national bodies in which the function of the members is to
represent the views and interests of their own states. 144 The factual
record appears to bear out the view that the IJC has been successful in act-
ing as an impartial and independent body making principled decisions.
141. There has been a good deal of academic writing with respect to the Treaty, including both
explication of the terms of the Treaty and evaluation of the success of the remedies it affords. For a
discussion of the Treaty in relation to the early development of the Garrison Diversion project, see
Gaines, supra note 17; Manley & Peterson, supra note 17; Goldberg, supra note 17; Peter Pantaleo,
Note, A Primer on the Boundary Waters Treaty and the International Joint Commission, 51 N.D. L.
REV. 493 (1975). The following sources detail the application of the Treaty and give an overview of
the mandate and procedures of the International Joint Commission: F.J.E. Jordan, Nature of Canada-
United States Relations, The International Joint Commission and Canada-United States Boundary Rela-
tions in CANADIAN PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION 522 (R. MacDonald, G.
Morris, D. Johnston eds., 1974); M.J. Vechsler, The International Joint Commission of Canada and the
United States: Its Roles and Responsibilities, Paper Presentation at the National Symposium on Water
Law, Canadian Bar Association, Environmental Law Continuing Legal Education Programme in Toron-
to, Ont., Can. (Apr. 1999). See Stephen J. Toope & Jutta Brunn6e, Freshwater Regimes: The Mandate
of the International Joint Commission, 15 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 273, for an evaluation of the effi-
cacy of the Treaty and the application of "regime theory." For a discussion of international envir-
onmental protection of freshwater resources, see Jutta Brunn~e, Environmental Security and Fresh-
water Resources: The Role of International Law. John E. Carroll & Newell B. Mack, On Living To-
gether in North America: Canada, The United States and International Environmental Relations, 12
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 35, analyze the relationship between Canada and the U.S. with respect to
environmental issues and advocate a more authoritative role for the IJC. Also see the International
Joint Commission's own writing about its role in IJC HANDBooK, supra note 36; INTERNATIONAL JOINT
COMMISSION, THE IJC AND THE 21ST CENTURY 4 (Response of the IJC to a Request by the Governments
of Canada and the United States for Proposals on How to Best Assist them to meet the Environmental
Challenges of the 21st Century), available at http://www.ijc.org/comm/21ste.htm [hereinafter IJC AND
THE 21 ST CENTURY], Finally, see Leonard B. Dworsky & Albert E. Utton, Assessing North America's
Management of its Transboundary Waters, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 413 (1993), which sup-ports the more
active watershed management and pollution prevention role that the IJC advocates for itself.
142. See IJC HANDBOOK, supra note 36, at 2.
143. See IJC HANDBOOK, supra note 36, at 4.
144. The contrasting example the lIC uses is the Commission on Environmental Cooperation
(CEC), the body established pursuant to the North American Agreement on Environmental Coopera-
tion, Sept. 14, 1993, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 1480 (entered into force Jan. I, 1994) (the side agree-
ment to the North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 289).
See THE IJC AND THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 141.
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It seems that in 1909, the primary purposes for the Treaty likely
were to ensure free and open navigation, regulate priority of use of
shared waters and control the raising and lowering of water levels. 145
The Treaty includes provisions that address both boundary waters, that is,
lakes and rivers flowing along the international boundary line with
shores on both sides of the international line (for example, four of the
Great Lakes), 146 and transboundary waters, such as the Red River of the
North, which rise in one country and flow across the border into the
other (and some, such as the Souris River, which rise in one country and
then cross the border more than once). 147 The Devils Lake outlet would
direct water into the Sheyenne River which empties into the Red River of
the North, a transboundary water. The United States has acknowledged
the application of the Treaty to the Devils Lake dispute in passing the
Appropriations Acts described above, each of which required that there
be a finding by the Secretary of State that the project would not "violate
the requirements or intent" of the Treaty. 148 What then are the require-
ments and the intent of the Treaty?
2. Transboundary Water Provisions
The provisions of the Treaty which directly address transboundary
waters are Articles II and IV. 14 9 The first paragraph of Article IV
provides that neither of the governments will permit the construction of
works which would raise the water level on the other side of the border
without first obtaining an order of approval from the IJC or reaching a
special agreement with the other government. 150 This is the only circum-
stance in which a government must apply to the IJC for an order of
approval before constructing a work in a transboundary waterway. It
145. Manley & Peterson, supra note 17, at 332-38, and Pantaleo, supra note 141, at 494-96, begin
with an interesting summary of the historical origins of the Treaty, but see especially the analysis of
purposes of the Treaty in Gaines, supra note 17. Gaines' views are based on a detailed analysis of the
negotiations leading up to the Treaty.
146. This explanation is simplified-"boundary waters" are defined explicitly in the Pre-liminary
Article of the Treaty; transboundary waters are referred to in article IV of the Treaty as "waters
flowing across the boundary." Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 8, art. IV, 36 Stat. 2448, 2450.
147. While the Green Peace motto is "we all live downstream," Gord Hannon, of the Depart-
ment of Justice of Manitoba often points out that Manitoba in fact is "downstream from everywhere."
Gord Hannon, Rivers Run to the Sea, Paper Presentation at the National Symposium on Water Law,
Canadian Bar Association, Environmental Law Continuing Legal Education Programme in Toronto,
Ont. Can. (Apr. 1999). Manitoba is downstream from both Canadian provinces which border it,
Ontario and Saskatchewan, and both American states, North Dakota and Minnesota.
148. See statutes cited supra notes 97, 100.
149. See Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 8, arts. II, IV, 36 Stat. 2448, 2450.
150. If an order of approval is required, Article VIII sets the procedure and determines the fac-
tors for the decision to be made by the IJC. See the history of the negotiation of each of the terms of
the Treaty and Gaines' opinion of their meaning in Gaines, supra note 17.
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would not seem that this provision would apply to the Devils Lake outlet
dispute, unless there were to be a concern about a rise in level of the
downstream water bodies. The concerns stated by Canadian authorities to
date appear to be about effects on water quality and the introduction of
non-native biota, rather than about water level. Therefore, there does not
appear to be a role for the IJC in issuing a decision which would be
binding on the two governments in advance of construction of the outlet.
3. The Article II Remedy
Article II deals with works for the "use and diversion" of water on
one side of the border which cause injury on the other side, but states
that each government reserves to itself the "exclusive jurisdiction and
control over the use and diversion, whether temporary or permanent, of
all waters on its own side of the line . . ." 151 There is an interesting
remedy provided in Article II, however, in the form of a right of action
to address the harm that such a work may cause:
[A]ny interference with or diversion from their natural channel
of such waters on either side of the boundary, resulting in any
injury on the other side of the boundary, shall give rise to the
same rights and remedies and entitle the injured parties to the
same legal remedies as if such injury took place in the country
where such diversion or interference occurs .... 152
It does not appear that this provision has been invoked on either
side of the border as a remedy for damage suffered on the other, al-
though there has been an (unsuccessful) attempt by a Canadian to use
the provision to sue for losses experienced on his own side of the bor-
der. 153 It appears reasonable to argue that the construction of a Devils
Lake outlet could be construed as "an interference with," or "us&' of,
the Red River system and that a reduction of water quality or the intro-
duction of foreign biota could result in an injury. The special cause of
action created in this provision grants an injured person only those legal
151. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 8, art. II, 36 Stat. 2448, 2449. Pantaleo, supra note 141,
at 495, takes the view that this notion had its origins in the Harmon Doctrine. Gaines, supra note 17,
argues that at the time of the Treaty, the Harmon Doctrine already was in direct conflict with inter-
national riparian law, which provided that the riparian rights of a nation-state, similar to those of indi-
viduals in the common law world, were limited by the requirement that quantity and quality of water
downstream not be diminished. Gaines takes the view that the Harmon doctrine played no part in the
drafting of the Article IV right of action, preferring the explanation that protection of the right of each
nation to be "in the first instance the judge of its own international obligations" is "usual in
international law."
152. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 8, art. 11, 36 Stat. 2448, 2449.
153. See generally Burnell v. International Joint Comm'n (1976), 71 DLR.(3d)725 (Fed Ct. 1976).
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remedies, which would have been allowed under the law of the jurisdic-
tion in which the work was built.154 Gaines, writing in 1974 about the
use that could be made of the Treaty in opposing the Garrison Diversion,
undertook a comprehensive analysis of the intent of the Treaty, includ-
ing the subject matter and scope of Article 11.155 He predicted that the
provision would be read narrowly as applying only to quantity rather
than quality of the water. 156
One argument Gaines offered for a narrow reading is based on the
pollution provision in Article IV.157 He took the view that increased
salinity (the effect which was feared at the time that he was writing)
would be considered to be pollution. 158 Pollution is mentioned explicit-
ly in a different article which grants no private right of action. 159 This
suggests that no such right is intended in the case of damage caused by
pollution. The other argument Gaines raised in favour of a narrow
reading is based on his analysis of the purpose of Articles II and IV of
the Treaty as being to address the raising and lowering of water levels,
rather than issues of water quality.160
Still, Gaines was addressing a factual circumstance in which in-
creased salinity would result from the drainage of return irrigation flows
into the Souris River, not a circumstance in which a structure would be
built to convey water directly from one water body into another. On a
plain reading of the provision, there seems to be no logical reason why a
court should not consider the addition of water to a river in order to
lower water levels in another water body as a "use" of the river. If the
construction of an outlet is considered to be a "use" of the trans-
boundary waterway and it results in damage, the Article II remedy would
apply. An action would be successful if the law of North Dakota and the
United States supports a cause of action for the harm that is threatened to
be caused-that is, a loss of fish and other natural resources and an
increase in the cost of water treatment.
The existence of such a remedy and the possibility that a govern-
ment could become liable for the payment of compensation for the
destruction of a fishery may itself be a powerful incentive for the govern-
ment to ensure that it does not take an action that causes compensable
harm across the border. The fact that the private law remedy is contem-
plated and that there is a reasonable argument in favour of a cause of
154. See Gaines, supra note 17.
155. See Gaines, supra note 17.
156. See Gaines, supra note 17.
157. See Gaines, supra note 17.
158. See Gaines, supra note 17.
159. See Gaines, supra note 17.
160. See Gaines, supra note 17.
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action based upon it may be a sufficient incentive to influence govern-
ments to assess in advance the environmental effects of projects such as
the Devils Lake outlet and avoid taking steps which could trigger an
Article II remedy.
4. The Article IV Duty Not to Pollute
The Treaty also includes an explicit measure to prevent degradation
of water quality.161 The second paragraph of Article IV contains the
covenant about pollution which is discussed above. 162 It clearly applies
both to boundary and transboundary waters: "It is further agreed that
the waters herein defined as boundary waters and waters flowing across
the boundary shall not be polluted on either side to the injury of health
or property on the other."1 63
As demonstrated above, it would appear likely that it is this provi-
sion which provides the basis for Canada's position with respect to the
Devils Lake dispute. There seems little doubt that degradation of water
quality and/or the introduction of non-native biota, which results in in-
jury to health or property across the border, would be considered to be
"pollution" for the purpose of the Treaty. 164
It appears that concern about compliance with the Article IV duty
not to pollute is the spur that motivated the United States to agree to the
1977 Garrison Reference to the IJC. This also seems to be the concern
that continues to motivate the United States to maintain its dialogue with
Canada in the form of the Garrison Joint Technical Committee. The IJC
itself has expressed an opinion with respect to the implications of the
Article IV obligation in a 1988 reference report about a proposed
Canadian project.165 Again, in that case as in the Garrison report, the IJC
161. See Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 8, art. IV, 36 Stat. 2448, 2450.
162. See Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 8, art. IV, 36 Stat. 2448, 2450.
163. See Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 8, art. IV, 36 Stat. 2448, 2450.
164. Gaines, supra note 17, offers a detailed analysis of the meaning of "pollution," and the appli-
cation of this provision to the Garrison Diversion project as it was conceived in 1974 (before the refe-
rence to the IJC). Also see Pantaleo, supra note 141,at 506-07, for a discussion of how this provision
could be used in private law actions in the domestic courts of the United States to address harm that
may be suffered in connection with the Garrison Diversion project. Writing more recently, Carlos
Manual Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1082 (1992),
argues for a theory which would permit such treaty provisions to be used as the basis for legal action
in American domestic courts. Haudenosaunee Six Nations of Iroquois (Confederacy) of North America
v. Canada, Great Britain, United States 1998 WL 748352 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 1998) and Six Nations of
Iroquois (Confederacy) of North America v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 1999 WL 528822
(W.D.N.Y. July 22, 1999), are decisions in a case in which the plaintiff attempted unsuccessfully to
use the Treaty pollution provision as the basis for a private right of action against Canada, Great
Britain and the United States. The complaint was dismissed at the outset on the basis, inter alia, that it
disclosed no cause of action, but it should be noted that plaintiffs appeared without counsel, and the
hearings focused on procedural deficiencies.
165. See INTERINAL JOINT COMMISSION, IMPACTS OF A PROPOSED COAL MINE IN THE FLATHEAD
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explicitly adopted the precautionary approach and recommended that
the project not proceed, stating that:
The Commission believes that, to ensure that the provisions of
the Boundary Waters Treaty are honoured, when any proposed
development project has been shown to create an identified risk
of a transboundary impact in contravention of Article IV,
existence of that risk should be sufficient to prevent the devel-
opment from proceeding. This principle should apply, even
though the degree of the risk cannot be measured with certain-
ty, unless and until it is agreed that such an impact-or the risk
of it occurring -is acceptable to both parties.166
The project at issue in that report, a proposed coal mine in the Flat-
head River Basin, also was stopped after the IJC reported its recommenda-
tions. 167 The need to avoid violation of the Article IV Treaty obligation
not to pollute thus seems to have proved to be a powerful influence on
governments on both sides of the border.
5. Dispute Resolution by the IJC under the Treaty
The Treaty sets out two means by which the two countries can
address disputes with each other: submission to arbitration by the IJC,
and a reference for the opinion of the IJC, such as was done in the case
of the Garrison and Flathead River Basin projects.168 A ruling binding
on both parties can be obtained by arbitration, but the submission to
arbitration may only be made upon the consent of both the United States
and Canada.169 The submission of a reference to the IJC for "exami-
nation and report" may be done by one party alone,170 but in fact, there
has never been a reference by one party without the consent of the other.
Nor has there been a submission to arbitration under Article X.171 The
IJC has conducted over fifty references, some prompted by proposals for
projects, such as Garrison and the Flathead River Basin coal mine, which
entailed a risk of violation of the Treaty.172 The references have been
conducted according to the practice described above for the Garrison
reference, employing both technical assessment by experts and public
RIVER BASIN 9 (Dec. 1988).
166. Id.
167. See id.
168. See Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 8, art. IX, 36 Stat. 2448, 2452.
169. See Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 8, art. IX, 36 Stat. 2448, 2452.
170. See Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 8, art. IX, at 2452.
171. See Vechsler, supra note 141, at 11.
172. See IJC Handbook, supra note 36, at 68.
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hearings to gather information. 173 The recommendations made by the
IJC as a result of these references generally have been followed.174
The proper role of the IJC has been much discussed in the legal
literature. Most writers advocate a more authoritative role for the IJC or
the creation of a parallel tribunal which would be able to render binding
decisions upon a submission to arbitration by one party alone.175 Gold-
berg, writing about Garrison in 1981 (during the time between the IJC
reference report and the formation of the Canada-United States Consulta-
tive Group), expressed the view that there was a need for a tribunal to be
created which would issue binding decisions when asked to do so by a
party who was experiencing harm or who feared harm from trans-
boundary pollution.176 Whether such a solution would or would not be
the most desirable means of dealing with such issues, it is clear that in the
intervening nearly twenty years, no such tribunal has been created.
Indeed, the fact that the arbitration provision of the Treaty has never
been used may be an indication that the political will for such a measure
does not yet exist.
The recommendation of the IJC itself in the Garrison reference was
to approach such problems by entering into water quality agreements to
cooperatively manage water quality in transboundary watersheds, instead
of waiting until a particular project had been proposed.177 While there
has been cooperative effort between the two countries in the intervening
years under the aegis of the IJC,178 no watershed management board
exists today to make binding decisions with respect to the Devils Lake
dispute. 179 In reality, the Devils Lake dispute and others like it will
continue to occur in the context of specific projects which are seen as
beneficial, advantageous or necessary on one side of the border or the
other. In practical terms, notwithstanding the cogency and passion of
legal arguments which have been made, 180 the time may not have arrived
for transnational decision making with respect to environmental issues in
North America. A process is needed today to deal with such problems
which does not require an evolution in political will and a merging of the
administrative and judicial functions of the two national governments.
173. See IJC Handbook, supra note 36, at 68.
174. See Vechsler, supra note 141, at 27. Vechsler offers the examples of the Garrison Diver-
sion, an American project and the Cabin Creek coal mine, a Canadian project.
175. See Dworsky & Utton, supra note 141, at 186-89; Goldberg, supra note 17, at 452-53.
176. See Goldberg, supra note 17, at 188-89.
177. See INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, supra note 26, at 96-97.
178. See the efforts described by the IJC in THE IJC AND THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 141.
179. See the further recommendation for such boards by the IJC in THE lJC AND THE 21ST CEN-
TURY, supra note 141, and support for the concept in the legal literature by Dworsky & Utton, supra
note 141.
180. See, e.g., Brunnde, supra note 141.
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6. The Lessons of Garrison for the Role of the IJC
What can be learned about the influence of the IJC from the
thirty-year history of the Garrison dispute? It is self evident that both
the existence of the pollution provision in the Treaty and the recommen-
dations made by the IJC in the Garrison reference and other references
have had an impact on the American decision-making process. The
reference to the Treaty in the Reformulation Act, the method it encom-
passes for ensuring Treaty compliance, the fact that the Garrison project
has been reconfigured in recognition of Canada's interests and the fact
that no portion of the project which could impact Canadian waters has
been built, all constitute solid evidence that the Treaty has had a
powerful effect.
That effect has been felt largely on the influence that consideration
of transboundary effects has been given in the American federal environ-
mental assessment process.181 As shown above, it would appear that the
joint technical assessment process developed by the IJC was adopted by
the American government, and applied in the context of its domestic
environmental assessment process when developing Garrison plans in
1990. The Joint Technical Committee continues to date to work in an
effective manner to gather information and conduct planning efforts
with respect to the Garrison project. The influence of the Treaty and the
IJC may be realized best by this influence on the American domestic
process of environmental assessment.
B. CONTRIBUTION TO THE DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT
1. An Overview of Federal Assessment on Both Sides of the
Border
One practical solution for such a problem is for the country which
may be impacted to contribute information during the process of
environmental impact assessment which is now mandated for federal
projects on both sides of the border. Each of the statutes passed with
respect to the Garrison and Devils Lake projects has recognized the
requirement to complete an environmental assessment process in compli-
ance with the rules set out in NEPA. Similarly, if a project such as Devils
Lake were proposed in Manitoba, it likely would trigger inter alia
181. See, e.g., SYKESTON CANAL ALTERNATIVE STUDY, supra note 78.
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environmental assessment and licensing processes under The Environ-
ment Act 182 and the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act. 183 NEPA
and the regulations implementing it provide, at a minimum, that a Devils
Lake outlet cannot be constructed with federal funding, or upon the
issuance of a federal permit, without completion of an Environmental
Impact Statement and a Record of Decision by the Administration. 184
The process requires that decision makers take a "hard look at the
environmental consequences of the decision.185
2. NEPA and Transboundary Issues
It appears that the NEPA impact assessment is intended also to cover
the transboundary effects of federal actions. An Executive Order issued
by President Carter in 1979 specified that NEPA applies even to actions
taken by the United States outside its borders. 186 The Council for
Environmental Quality (CEQ) has recently issued a memorandum to
heads of agencies giving guidance as to the need to apply NEPA to pro-
posed federal actions in the United States with transboundary effects. 187
The CEQ takes the position that NEPA "requires analysis and disclosure
of transboundary impacts of proposed federal actions taking place in the
United States."188 The CEQ relies for its interpretation in part on provi-
sions of NEPA which refer to the "worldwide and long-range character
of environmental problems," and the direction it gives to federal agen-
cies to "assist other countries in anticipating and preventing a decline in
the quality of the world environment." 189 They point out that the
weight of the body of NEPA law, including NEPA, the regulations and
case law, requires that federal agencies must assess environmental im-
pacts to the extent that they are reasonably foreseeable, regardless of
182. S.M. 1987-88, c.26, section 12 and the Classes of Development Regulation, Man. Reg.
164/88 (defining certain inter-basin water transfers and flood control projects as "developments"
which require an environmental license). A comprehensive environmental assessment process is
required in order to obtain the license. Pursuant to section 54 of the Act, the Crown (that is, the
provincial government and its agencies) is bound by the Act.
183. See S.C. 1992, c. 37, which is discussed infra.
184. See Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852; Environmental Impact Statement, 40 C.F.R. pt. 1502;
NEPA and Agency Decisionmaking, 40 C.F.R. pt. 1505; Other Requirements of NEPA, 40 C.F.R. pt.
1506; Terminology and Index, 40 C.F.R. pt. 1508.
185. Association of Pub. Agency Customers, Inc. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 126 F.3d 1158,
1187-89 (9th Cir. 1997).
186. See Exec. Order No. 12,114, 44 Fed. Reg. 1957 (Jan. 4, 1979).
187. See Memorandum from Kathleen A. McGinty, Chair, Council on Environmental Quality, to
Heads of Agencies on the Application of the National Environmental Policy Act to Proposed Federal
Actions in the United States with Transboundary Effects (July 1, 1997) (on file with author).
188. Id.
189. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY GUIDANCE ON NEPA ANALYSES FOR TRANSBOUNDARY
IMPACTS 2 (July 1, 1997) [hereinafter CEQ GUIDANCE] (on file with author) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
4332(2)(F)).
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where they occur. 190 They specifically require that agencies be alive to
the potential impacts of federal actions on transboundary watersheds. 191
In addition, the CEQ re-states the principle of international law that
"no nation may undertake acts on its territory that will harm the territo-
ry of another state." 192 This principle was first stated in the course of a
decision by the IJC on a reference with respect to a proposed smelter
which was expected to have transboundary effects on air quality. 193 This
decision generally is cited as the original source for this doctrine in inter-
national law.194 There seems to be little doubt, then, that the American
federal environmental impact assessment process generally is intended to
include assessment of transboundary impacts.
3. Canadian Participation in the Garrison Environmental
Assessment: Success of the Specially Designed Process
Canadian participation in the American federal assessment process
undertaken in the Garrison project has been a practical means of
addressing Canadian concerns since the formation of the Garrison Joint
Technical Committee. As described above, the recommendations which
have resulted from the work of the Committee, such as those contained
in their November, 1990 report,195 have served as the means for both
accommodating Canadian concerns and for guiding, in a practical sense,
the direction of further planning of the project. The lesson that may be
learned is that beneficial results occur when government technical
experts from both sides of the border work together to gather and share
information in a specially structured format.
4. Canadian Participation in Devils Lake Environmental
Assessment
Canada and Manitoba also have attempted to contribute actively to
the federal environmental assessment process for Devils Lake, though, as
explained above, that process has only reached the phase of scoping the
assessment. This contribution has come in the form of comments sub-
mitted on the scoping work done by the U.S. Corps of Army Engineers,
190. See id. at 2,3.
191. See id. at 4.
192. Id. at 5 (citing the Trail Smelter Arbitration, U.S. v. Canada, 3 UN Rep. Int'l Arbit. Awards
1911 (1941), at 5).
193. The Treaty provides that the IJC can hear "any questions or matters of difference" referred
to it by the two governments, not just issues relating to boundary or transboundary waters.
194. See Gaines, supra note 17; CEQ Guidance, supra note 189, at 5-6; Brunned, supra note 141
at 125-26.
195. See GARRISON JOINT TECHNICAL COMMrrTEE, supra note 29, at 37-42.
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which "has identified serious concerns with the ability to operate an
outlet to meet existing water quality standards."1 96 It is possible that
Manitoba's concerns will be addressed in the context of the technical
studies performed under the direction of the Corps. The Corps has been
conducting or overseeing a wide variety of studies, including Devils
Lakewater level, quality modeling, climate studies, modeling of down-
stream water quality, and reviewing the literature with respect to the biota
transfer issue. 197 It would appear that whatever the ultimate scope of the
environmental assessment is to be, the Corps of Engineers is well aware
that downstream water quality and biota transfer are two of the issues
which will have to be addressed. The February 15, 1996, Devils Lake
Contingency Plan included a reference to the need to address the biota
transfer issue, recognizing that:
An emergency outlet to the Sheyenne River faces the same chal-
lenges of environmental, W.Q. [water quality], biota, political,
cost and other issues as a permanent outlet. Thus, the same
Federal, State, local, interstate and international players would
be involved. The decision-making process must prioritize
several factors, including biota transfer .... 198
The section of the 1996 Contingency Plan dealing with biota
transfer states that the issue was being considered by the "Garrison Joint
Technical Committee, a technical arm of the Canadian-United States
Consultative Group."199 At that time, the Joint Technical Committee did
compile existing data, review that material and attempt to identify gaps in
the scientific and technical information and research, as a preliminary
step to identifying the research requirements which should be addressed
during a full assessment. It drafted a report which was intended to be an
internal working document shared with government agencies. 200 As
stated above, Canada also has contributed comments to the Corps in the
scoping phase of the environmental impact assessment, as have many
other interested persons, during the public review of the Corps' draft
scoping document. While it is possible that each of the research needs
identified by the Joint Technical Committee in its report will be taken
into account by the Corps in setting the specific terms of each of the
196. See Manitoba's Concerns, supra note 3.
197. See Corps Conducting Wide Range of Studies as Final Scoping Document Nears Completion,
DEVILS LAKE EMERGENCY OUTLET NEWSLETTER (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, St. Paul District &
North Dakota State Water Comm'n), Oct. 1998, at 1-4.
198. DEVILS LAKE CONTINGENCY PLAN, supra note 85.
199. See DEVILS LAKE CONTINGENCY PLAN, supra note 85.
200. Interview with Robert V. Oleson, supra note 117.
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studies to be performed as part of the full environmental impact
assessment, the NEPA process as it is formally structured does not ensure
that this will occur. Nor does the process provide for Canadian
representatives to participate with the Corps in making decisions with
respect to setting the terms of those studies, assist in carrying them out or
overseeing their completion, or considering the results and drafting the
environmental impact statement with respect to Canadian interests.
C. FINDING A METHOD THAT WORKS
1. A New Model for Assessing Transboundary Effects
It would appear that the better plan would be to incorporate into all
environmental assessment processes involving transboundary effects, not
only consideration of transboundary effects, but a formal method for
allowing all the interested governments to participate in the assessment.
It is to be expected that both Canada and the United States intend to
comply with Treaty obligations to each other, and that an assessment of
potential environmental effects performed by a bi-national panel of
credible, well-qualified experts whose mandate is to strive for impartiality
would assist both in doing so. The IJC's method of appointing bi-
national groups of technical experts to study the issues forms one
example of the means by which this can be accomplished. It may be
that such a method can be incorporated readily into the method of assess-
ment which is followed in each jurisdiction with respect to projects which
entail a risk of transboundary effects. Examination of the practice fol-
lowed in Canada may provide a model for such a method, and a focus
for its application to the international setting.
2. A Digression: Canadian Division of Powers
It may be helpful at this point to make a digression in order to
provide a brief explanation of the Canadian constitutional division of
powers, so that the relative positions of Canada and Manitoba will be
clear with respect to a transboundary dispute of this nature. Canadian
constitutional law does not allocate responsibility either for water issues
or for the environment wholly to either level of government. Each has
functional powers and general powers which include jurisdiction over
environmental issues. At the risk of greatly over-simplifying the issues,
the federal government has jurisdiction over specific matters, such as
federal Crown lands (most Crown lands in the provinces being under the
control of the Provinces), navigation, protection of fisheries, pollution of
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coastal waters outside the boundaries of any province and likely the
pollution of inter-provincial waterways. 2 01 Canadian constitutional law,
for the most part, grants to provinces the regulation of property and civil
rights, and ownership and jurisdiction over renewable and non-renewable
natural resources, including the ownership and regulation of private
proprietary rights in fish, water and water-related resources. 202 Thus,
although federal jurisdiction over the environment is an evolving area of
Canadian law, to date the provinces have exercised the most direct
control over environmental decision making.
Jurisdiction with respect to the Treaty is clearer. American readers
may have noticed that the full name of the Treaty indicates that the party
contracting on behalf of Canada in 1909 was Great Britain. As constitu-
tional law expert Professor Hogg explains, Canada did not acquire full
international legal personality until 1926, when the Balfour Declaration
conveyed to the federal government the practical right to conduct
Canada's foreign affairs and make treaties, with the last vestiges of Great
Britain's power to conduct foreign affairs eliminated in 1947.203 Al-
though there is no Supremacy Clause204 in the Canadian constitution,
such as there is in the American, the Canadian constitution does include
a power to implement such treaties on behalf of both the federal govern-
ment and the provinces. 205 That power belongs unquestionably to the
federal government and, generally, must be exercised through the
passage of legislation for that purpose. 206 The federal government has
201. For an overview of the division of powers with respect to environmental matters see Marie-
Ann Bowden, Jurisdictional Issues in E.L. HUGHES, A.R. LUCAS & W.A. TILLEMAN, ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW AND POLICY (2d ed. 1998) and Neil Finkelstein & Rachel Urman, Constitutional Jurisdiction in
Relation to Water Law, in the CBA National Symposium on Water Law, supra note 141.
202. The Constitution Act, 1867, subsections 92(13) (property and civil rights in the province),
and 92(16) (all matters of a local or private nature) section 109 (ownership of land, mines and miner-
als) and section 92A (ownership of non-renewable natural resources, forestry and electrical energy)
and the Natural Resource Transfer Agreement(s), which transferred equivalent rights to the provinces
which were not parties to confederation in 1867. Federal jurisdiction over navigation and shipping is
in subsection .91(10), and protection of the fishery resource is in subsection 91(12). The extent of
federal jurisdiction over protection of the environment, including water resources, is an evolving area
of Canadian constitutional law. See Bowden, supra note 201, for an introduction to the case law which
comprises the judicial debate over Canadian constitutional jurisdiction over the environment, and
Finkelstein & Urman, supra note 197, for a detailed discussion of constitutional issues relating to water
in Canada.
203. See PETER W. HOGG, CONSTrrTUONAL LAW OF CANADA 11-2 (loose-leaf ed. 1997).
204. U.S. CONST. art. V1, cl 2.
205. The treaty-implementation power is found in section 132 of the Constitution Act, 1867.
206. See Hogg, supra note 203, at 11-5. There are circumstances in which Canada can im-
plement a treaty without legislation but not if the treaty affects any private or Crown right, or requires
any government action other than executive action of the federal government. Professor Hogg con-
trasts the Canadian Constitution with the American Constitution, which in Article VI simply states that
all treaties are "the supreme law of the land." While treaties made by the Empire could be implement-
ed by the federal government alone, the implementation of treaties made by the federal government
since 1926 is a different story. Until the 1937 decision in A.-G. Can. v. A.-G. Ont., [1937] A.C. 326
(the "Labour Conventions" case), it was argued that the section 132 federal power to implement
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enacted such legislation with respect to the Treaty. The federal statute
which confirms and sanctions the Treaty states that it amends both
federal and provincial statutes to the extent that they are inconsistent with
the Treaty, and specifies that the Federal Court is the court of jurisdiction
for Article IV claims. 207 For the purpose of applying the Treaty in the
international context, then, the "Canadians" are represented by the
federal government of Canada, and jurisdiction over international rela-
tions with respect to the Treaty belongs to the federal government.
Not so, however, for the enforcement of rights under Article II of
the Treaty. To the extent that damage is suffered as a consequence of
impacts to water quality or harm to fish, a right to take legal action on
the basis of that harm likely lies with the Crown in right of the affected
province and/or the persons whose private rights are affected. In addi-
tion, because of the more active role played by the provinces in regula-
tion of the environment generally, including mining, forestry and in
large part impacts to freshwater quality, it is the provincial ministries
whose officials have much of the expertise which is required to assess
and monitor a project such as the Devils Lake outlet. It may be seen,
therefore, that both Manitoba and Canada have active roles to play in
disputes such as Devils Lake and in ensuring that Treaty obligations with
respect to environmental matters are met. It is to be expected that North
Dakota and the federal government of the United States have a similar
division of interests.
3. The Canadian Model for Inter-Jurisdictional Cooperation
Both the Canadian federal and provincial jurisdictions have enacted
statutes which mandate environmental assessment in certain circumstanc-
es. In Manitoba, as an example, there is a requirement to obtain an
environmental license to engage in developments which may be expect-
ed to have all sorts of environmental impacts, including point source
emissions to air, land or water, and changes to the natural environment,
such as interbasin diversions of water. 208 When a proposal for such a
license is filed, the regulator sets an environmental assessment process
which includes, at a minimum, a review of the proposal by a technical
advisory committee (TAC) comprised of government officials (and on
Empire treaties had devolved on the federal government. The Labour Conventions case decided that
the provinces each would have to enact legislation to make the parts of treaties which fell within their
jurisdiction effective. The constitutional arguments for explicitly overruling the Labour Conventions
case, or finding a treaty-implementation power in the general federal power, especially with respect
to environmental protection treaties, contribute to lively discussion and speculation in Canadian legal
literature and case law. For an overview, see the discussion in Hogg at I 1-12-11-16.
207. See Intemational Boundary Waters Treaty Act, R.S.C., c. 1-20, s. 2.




occasion others) with relevant expertise. Since 1989, it has been fairly
standard practice for Manitoba also to include in the TAC any federal
officials who have relevant expertise. 209 For several years, Canadian juris-
dictions have been involved at efforts toward formal "harmonization,"
which is creating symmetry between the types of requirements that may
be made by each of the governments, and cooperation in conducting
environmental assessments. The first formal agreement between Canada
and Manitoba to work towards harmonization in environmental assess-
ment was signed in 1994, and renewed in June, 2000.210 The federal
statute which mandates environmental assessment, the Canadian Environ-
mental Assessment Act (CEAA), is relatively new, but was pre-dated by an
executive order requiring environmental assessment which also had the
force of law. 211 In similar fashion to NEPA, CEAA generally requires
environmental assessment, of projects: that will receive federal funding;
that require a disposition of federal lands; of which the federal govern-
ment is the proponent; or which cannot take place without the issuance
of specified federal permits. 212 The environmental assessment must be
completed and a report issued before the federal authority may exercise
the function which triggered the assessment.
In addition, one of the explicit purposes of CEAA is "to ensure that
projects that are to be carried out in Canada or on federal lands do not
cause significant adverse environmental effects outside the jurisdictions
in which the projects are carried out." 213 These include both internal
transboundary effects and international effects.2 14 In addition to the
specific "triggers" described above, there is discretion for the federal
government to initiate an environmental impact assessment if a proposed
project could "cause significant adverse environmental effects in an-
other province" or "outside Canada." 215 The federal authority is also
empowered to forbid the proponent to carry out the project until the
assessment has been completed.2 16 These provisions would seem to
cover all Canadian projects similar to the North Dakota State plan for
Devils Lake.
209. Interview with Dan McNaughton, Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency (Oct. 2000).
210. See Canada-Manitoba Agreement for Environmental Assessment Corporation (1994);
Canada-Manitoba Agreement on Environmental Assessment Cooperation (June 2, 2000).
211. See Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, S.C. 1992, c. 37; Environmental Assessment
and Review Process Guidelines Order SOR/84-467; Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Canada
(Minister of Transport) (1992), 1 S.C.R. 3, 132 N.R. 321 (S.C.C.).
212. See id. section 5.
213. See id. section 4.
214. See id.
215. See id. sections 46, 47
216. See id. sections 46, 47, 50.
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4. Canadian and American Federal Assessment: A Joint
Approach
As does NEPA, the Canadian federal assessment process sets out
specific substantive and procedural requirements which must be met,
such as assessment of cumulative effects, consideration of comments
from the public and the consideration of feasible mitigation measures. 217
The provisions contemplate three levels of assessment, called screening,
comprehensive assessment, and panel review, with the panel review re-
served for cases which have been specially selected because of the poten-
tial for serious adverse effects and/or the level of public concern. 218 In
such cases, federal authorities have a duty to "consult and cooperate
[with any other Canadian jurisdiction which has an obligation to perform
environmental assessment of the project] respecting the assessment of the
environmental effects of the project." 219 NEPA too requires coopera-
tion with state and local agencies and the elimination of duplication by
engaging in joint assessment processes where feasible. 220
Although both CEAA and NEPA provide for assessment of trans-
boundary effects, CEAA contains a provision that does not appear to
have a parallel in American law. The CEAA provision allowing for a
joint review panel to be formed between federal and provincial juris-
dictions also allows for a joint review panel to be formed with the
government of a foreign state. 221 The contemplation is that the terms of
the environmental assessment process would be set by the two govern-
ments to meet the requirements of the law of both countries. While this
provision has not been used as yet, there is a record of experience in
Canada of joint assessment by federal and provincial jurisdictions which
suggests that the joint assessment approach can be effective. 222 Mani-
toba has a similar provision permitting its Minister to enter into an
agreement with another jurisdiction (federal or provincial) in order to
conduct a joint assessment process.223
It is true that the Canadian federal joint impact assessment process
does not formally come into play unless there is a requirement for a
217. See id. section 16.
218. See generally id.
219. Id. section 40(2)(b).
220. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1994); 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7(a)(1) (inviting participation in the scop-
ing process); 40 C.F.R. § 1506.2 (explicitly requiring the elimination of duplication with State and local
procedures by requiring cooperation and joint assessment to the fullest extent possible).
221. See section 40.
222. See generally the discussion of the Canadian joint assessment process in Rodney Northey,
The 1995 Annotated Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (Carswell, 1994).
223. See section 13.1 of The Environment Act.
[VOL. 76:817856
DEVILS LAKE OUTLET
jurisdiction(s) on both sides of the border to engage in an environmental
assessment process. One of the purposes of the provisions, however,
seems to be to create a practical means to allow joint participation in
environmental decision-making which affects jurisdictions on both sides
of the border. The principle behind the process appears to be that all the
jurisdictions which would be affected by the project should share in the
appointment of well-qualified experts instructed to work in an impartial
fashion to gather and review the relevant scientific and technical data.
There does not appear to be any reason why the model could not be
adapted for use in a circumstance such as that which exists for Garrison
or Devils Lake. Either federal government could invite the other gov-
ernment to enter into a formal agreement to participate in the other's
environmental assessment process by forming a panel to conduct the
assessment, or to review the assessment results and make recommen-
dations before a decision has been made. In the context of NEPA, this
could be done as a voluntary effort on the part of the decision maker
before drafting the required environmental impact statement and issuing
the certificate of decision. The work of the Joint Technical Committee
on the Garrison Diversion provides a practical example that such a
process can be useful in the context of fulfilling requirements under
NEPA. It would seem that such a step would further the fulfillment of
environmental assessment of transboundary effects required by the
CEQ.224
For the joint assessment approach to work over the long term, both
federal jurisdictions would have to make a commitment to ensure that all
projects with the potential for transboundary effects would be made
subject to a federal environmental assessment process, or at least to a
process with equivalent protections. As has been explained, the process
for such federal involvement has already been incorporated into Canadi-
an law. It would be necessary for American federal authorities to
undertake an analysis of the steps that would be required to ensure that
all projects which put compliance with American obligations under the
Treaty in issue are made subject to appropriate environmental assessment
law regimes. The North Dakota State Devils Lake outlet assessment plan,
which would not proceed according to such standards, would not be
sufficient. The assessment process that is required under the law of
Manitoba, as described briefly above, may meet the criteria.
One can imagine that a joint process with respect to Devils Lake
would involve an agreement or exchange of letters between Canada and
the United States that would result in the appointment of a team of
224. See generally CEQ GUIDANCE, supra note 189.
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Canadian experts to work together with the Corps of Engineers in
scoping and carrying out those aspects of the environmental impact
assessment which relate to transboundary effects. The experts, though
appointed by Canada, would include those scientists and engineers
employed by Manitoba who are most knowledgeable about the effects of
such a project. The results would form part of the environmental impact
statement which is ultimately produced. A report produced in that
fashion is likely to be more readily accepted on both sides of the border
as a credible basis for making decisions about the project than would a
report prepared without adequate consultation and cooperation.
5. Arguments in Favour of the Joint Approach
The creation of such a process is attractive for a variety of reasons.
The joint efforts would be incorporated into a legislated, structured
process of environmental assessment with minimum standards to be met,
a criterion which the ad hoc process proposed by the State of North
Dakota clearly does not meet.225 Formal consultation between diplomats
with respect to Treaty compliance would be based on information
gathered through international collaboration between technical experts
working together to issue an impartial, credible report. The proposed
joint process, unlike a referral to the IJC, provides for an active, shared
role for the foreign jurisdiction in environmental impact assessment
without taking the process outside the environmental assessment scheme
of the country in which the project is proposed. Neither jurisdiction
would run the risk of obtaining from an international tribunal a decision
with which it may not agree. In addition, the environmental impact
assessment itself, and the decision based on it, would remain subject to
judicial review in the courts of the country which had conducted the
assessment. No evolution in political will or statutory enactment would
likely to be required in either country in order to implement it. In
addition, if either side were to be displeased with the results, the opportu-
nity to refer the issue to the IJC or consider other legal options would
remain open.
IV. CONCLUSION
It has been well understood for many years on both sides of the
border that effective environmental impact assessment is integral to
sound planning. This is especially true with respect to decision making
225. See discussion supra Part II.S.
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about water resources. Both the United States and Canada have a require-
ment to comply with requirements of the Treaty. Both have effective
federal environmental assessment regimes in which planning for trans-
boundary impacts to waterways can be managed. Both have an apparent
reluctance to allow environmental impact assessment and decision
making with respect to such projects to be managed at the first instance
by an international tribunal. Both have an interest in creating a legal
process to manage such disputes which maintains the protections offered
by their internal political controls on decision making. Persons on both
sides of the border who may be affected by the assessment have an
interest in being able to apply to the courts for judicial review of both
the process of assessment and the decisions which result. It would seem
that the time has come for Canada and the United States to undertake an
experiment in joint environmental impact assessment within the context
of the mandatory environmental assessment process that forms part of
the federal law of both countries. The apparently intractable dispute
over Devils Lake, and others like it, may become manageable to the
benefit of all concerned in the result.
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